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Abstract. In this work we study preference systems suitable for the
Peer-to-Peer paradigm. Most of them fall in one of the three follow-
ing categories: global, symmetric and complementary. All these systems
share an acyclicity property. As a consequence, they admit a stable (or
Pareto eﬃcient) conﬁguration, where no participant can collaborate with
better partners than their current ones.
We analyze the representation of such preference systems and show that
any acyclic system can be represented with a symmetric mark matrix.
This gives a method to merge acyclic preference systems while retaining
the acyclicity property. We also consider properties of the correspond-
ing collaboration graph, such as clustering coeﬃcient and diameter. In
particular, the study of the example of preferences based on real latency
measurements shows that its stable conﬁguration is a small-world graph.
1 Introduction
Motivation In most current peer-to-peer (P2P) solutions participants are en-
couraged to cooperate with each other. Since collaborations may be costly in
terms of network resources (connection establishment, resource consumption,
maintenance), the number of connections is often bounded by the protocol. This
constraint encourages the clients to make a careful choice among other peers to
obtain a good performance from the system. The possibility to choose a bet-
ter partner implies that there exists a preference system, which describes the
interests of each peer.
The study of such preference systems is the subject of b-matching theory. It
has started forty-ﬁve years ago with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley on
stable marriages [1]. Although the original paper had a certain recreational math-
ematics ﬂavor, the model turned out to be especially valuable both in theory
and practice. Today, b-matching's applications are not limited to dating agencies,
but include college admissions, roommates attributions, assignment of graduat-
ing medical students to their ﬁrst hospital appointments, or kidney exchanges
programs [14]. The goal of the present paper is to expand b-matching applica-
tion domain to P2P networks by using it to model the interactions between the
clients of such networks.
Previous work The present work draws on and extends results obtained in [5],
where we covered general aspects of the b-matching theory application to the
dynamics of the node interactions. We considered preference systems natural
for the P2P paradigm, and showed that most of them fall into three categories:
global, symmetric, and complementary. We demonstrated that these systems
share the same property: acyclicity. We proved existence and uniqueness of a
stable conﬁguration for acyclic preference systems.
Contribution In this article, we analyze the links between properties of local
marks and the preference lists that are generated with those marks. We show that
all acyclic systems can be created with symmetric marks. We provide a method to
merge any two acyclic preference systems and retain the acyclic property. Finally,
our simulations show that real latency marks create collaboration graphs with
small-worlds properties, in contrast with random symmetric or global marks.
Roadmap In Section 2 we deﬁne the global, symmetric, complementary, and
acyclic preference systems, and provide a formal description of our model. In
Section 3 we demonstrate that all acyclic preferences can be represented using
symmetric preferences. We consider complementary preferences in Section 4,
and the results are extended to any linear combination of global or symmetric
systems. Section 5 discusses the properties of a stable solution providing an
example based on Meridian project measurements [6]. In Section 6 we discuss
the impact of our results, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Deﬁnition and applications of P2P preference systems
2.1 Deﬁnitions and general modeling assumptions
We formalize here a b-matching model for common P2P preference systems.
Acceptance graph Peers may have a partial knowledge of the network and
are not necessarily aware of all other participating nodes. Peers may also want
to avoid collaboration with certain others. Such criteria are represented by an
acceptance graph G(V,E). Neighbors of a peer p ∈ V are the nodes that may
collaborate with p. A conﬁguration C is a subset C˜ ⊂ E of the existing collabo-
rations at a given time.
Marks We assume peers use some real marks (like latency, bandwidth,. . . )
to rank their neighbors. This is represented by a valued matrix of marks m =
{m(i, j)}. A peer p uses m(p, i) and m(p, j) to compare i and j. Without loss of
generality, we assume that 0 is the best mark and m(p, i) < m(p, j) if and only
if p prefers i to j. If p is not a neighbor of q, then m(p, q) = ∞. We assume for
convenience a peer p has a diﬀerent mark for each of its neighbors. It implies
that a peer can always compare two neighbors and decide which one suits him
better.
Preference system A mark matrix M creates an instance L of a preference
system. L(p) is a preference list that indicates how a peer p ranks its neighbors.
The relation when p prefers q1 to q2 is denoted by L(p, q1) < L(p, q2). Note that
diﬀerent mark matrices can produce the same preference system.
Global preferences A preference system is global if it can be deduced from
global marks (m(i, p) = m(j, p) = m(p)).
Symmetric preferences A preferences system is symmetric if it can be de-
duced from symmetric marks (m(i, j) = m(j, i) for all i, j).
Complementary preferences A preferences system is complementary if it
can be deduced from marks of the form m(i, j) = v(j)− c(i, j), where v(j) val-
ues the resources possessed by j and c(i, j) the resources that i and j have in
common5.
Acyclic preferences A preferences system is acyclic if it contains no prefer-
ence cycle. A preference cycle is a cycle of at least three peers such that each
peer strictly prefers its successor to its predecessor along the cycle.
Quotas Each peer p has a quota b(p) (possibly inﬁnite) on the number of links
it can support. A b-matching is a conﬁguration C that respects the quotas. If
the quotas are greater than the number of possible collaborations, then simply
C = E would be an optimal solution for all.
Blocking pairs We assume that the nodes aim to improve their situation, i.e.
to link to most preferred neighbors. A pair of neighbors p and q is a blocking pair
of a conﬁguration C if {p, q} ∈ E \C and both prefer to change the conﬁguration
C and to link with the each other. We assume that system evolves by discrete
steps. At any step two nodes can be linked together if and only if they form a
blocking pair. Those nodes may drop their worst performing links to stay within
their quotas. A conﬁguration C is stable if no blocking pairs exist.
Loving pair Peers p, q form a loving pair if p prefers q to all its other neighbors
and q, in its turn, prefers p to all other neighbors. It implies a strong link which
cannot be destroyed in the given preference system.
2.2 Preference systems and application design
Depending on the P2P application, several important criteria can be used by
a node to choose its collaborators. We introduce the following three types as
representative of most situations:
Proximity: distances in the physical network, in a virtual space or similarities
according to some characteristics.
Capacity related: network bandwidth, computing capacity, storage capacity.
Distinction: complementary character of resources owned by diﬀerent peers.
5 Of course, in this case the preferred neighbor has a larger mark.
Notice that theses types correspond respectively to the deﬁnitions of sym-
metric, global and complementary preference system categories.
Examples of symmetric preferences are P2P applications which optimize la-
tencies. A classical approach for distributed hash-table lists of contacts is se-
lecting the contacts with the smallest round trip time (RTT) in the physical
network. In Pastry [7], a node will always prefer contacts with the smallest RTT
among all the contacts that can ﬁt into a given routing table entry. More gen-
erally, building a low latency overlay network with bounded degree requires to
select neighbors with small RTTs. Optimizing latencies between players can also
be crucial, for instance, for online real-time gaming applications [8]. Such pref-
erences are symmetric since the mark a peer p gives to some peer q is the same
as the mark q gives to p (the RTT between p and q).
Similarly, massively multiplayer online games (MMOG) require connecting
players with nearby coordinates in a virtual space [9, 10]. Again this can be mod-
eled by symmetric preferences based on the distance in the virtual space. Some
authors also propose to connect participants of a ﬁle sharing system according
to the similarity of their interests [11, 12], which is also a symmetric relation.
BitTorrent [13] is an example of a P2P application that uses a capacity related
preference system. In brief, a BitTorrent peer uploads to the peers from whom it
has the most downloaded during the last ten seconds. This is an implementation
of the well known Tit-for-Tat strategy. The mark of a peer can thus be seen as
its upload capacity divided by its collaboration quota.
This global preference nature of BitTorrent should be tempered by the fact
that only peers with complementary parts of the ﬁle are selected. Pushing for-
ward this requirement would lead to another selection criterion for BitTorrent:
preference for the peers possessing the most complementary set of ﬁle pieces. In
other words, each peer should try to exchange with peers possessing a large num-
ber of blocks it needs. We call this a complementary preference system. Note,
that this kind of preferences changes continuously as new pieces are downloaded.
However, the peers with the most complementary set of blocks are those, which
enable the longest exchange sessions.
In its more general form, the selection of partners for cooperative ﬁle down-
load can be seen as a mix of several global, symmetric, and complementary
preference systems.
3 Acyclic preferences equivalence
In [5], we have shown that global, symmetric and complementary preferences
are acyclic, that any acyclic b-matching preference instance has a unique sta-
ble conﬁguration, and that acyclic systems always converge toward their stable
conﬁguration. However, since acyclicity is not deﬁned by construction, one may
wonder whether other kinds of acyclic preferences exist. This section is devoted
to answering this question.
Theorem 1. Let P be a set of n peers, A be the set of all possible acyclic
preference instances on P , S be the set of all possible symmetric preference
instances on P , G be the set of all possible global preference instances, then
G $ A = S
This ensures that any acyclic instance can be described by the mean of sym-
metric marks. As a special case, global mark instances can be emulated by sym-
metric instances, though the reverse is not true. In the reminder of this section
we present the proof of theorem 1: we will ﬁrst show S ⊂ A and G ⊂ A, then
A ⊂ S, which will be followed by G 6= A.
Lemma 1. Global and symmetric preference systems are acyclic.
Proof. from [5] Let us assume the contrary, and assume that there is a circular
list of peers p1, . . . , pk (with k ≥ 3), such that each peer of the list strictly
prefers its successor to its predecessor. Written in the form of marks it means
that m(pi, pi+1) < m(pi, pi−1) for all i modulo k. Taking the sum for all possible
i, we get
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi+1) <
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi−1).
If marks are global, this can be rewritten
∑k
i=1m(pi) <
∑k
i=1m(pi), and if they
are symmetric,
∑k
i=1m(pi, pi+1) <
∑k
i=1m(pi, pi+1). Both are impossible, thus
global and symmetric marks create acyclic instances. uunionsq
The next part, A ⊂ S, uses the loving pairs described in 2.1. We ﬁrst prove
the existence of loving pairs in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. A nontrivial acyclic preference instance always admits at least one
loving pair.
Proof. A formal proof was presented in [5]. In short, if there is no loving pair,
one can construct a preference cycle by considering a sequence of ﬁrst choices of
peers.
Algorithm 1: Construction of a symmetric note matrix m given an acyclic
preferences instance L on n peers
N := 0
for all p and q, m(p, q) = +∞ (by default, peers do not accept each other)
while there exists a loving pair {i, j} do
m(i, j) := m(j, i) := N
Remove i from the preference list L(j) and j from L(i)
N := N + 1
Lemma 3. Let L be a preference instance. Algorithm 1 constructs a symmetric
mark matrix in O(n2) time that produces L.
Proof. The matrix output is clearly symmetric. Neighboring peers get ﬁnite
marks, while others have inﬁnite marks. If an instance contains a loving pair
{i, j} then m(i, j) = m(j, i) can be the best mark since i and j mutually prefer
each other to any other peers. According to Lemma 2 such a loving pair always
exists in the acyclic case. By removing the peers i and j from their preference
lists, we obtain a smaller acyclic instance with the same preference lists except
that i and j are now unacceptable to each other. The process continues until all
preference lists are eventually empty. The marks are given in increasing order,
therefore when m(p, q) and m(p, r) are ﬁnite, m(p, q) < m(p, r) iﬀ the loving
pair {p, q} is formed before the loving pair {p, r}, that is iﬀ p prefers q to r.
The algorithm runs in O(n2) time because an iteration of the while loop
takes O(1) time. A loving pair can especially be found in constant time by
maintaining a list on all loving pairs. The list is updated in constant time since,
after i and j becoming mutually unacceptable, each new loving pair contains
either i and its new ﬁrst choice, or j and its new ﬁrst choice. uunionsq
Not all acyclic preferences are global preferences. A simple counter-example
uses 4 peers p1, p2, p3 and p4 with the following preference lists:
L(p1) : p2, p3, p4 L(p2) : p1, p3, p4 L(p3) : p4, p1, p2 L(p4) : p3, p1, p2
L is acyclic, but p1 prefers p2 to p3 whereas p4 prefers p3 to p2. p1 and p4
rate p2 and p3 diﬀerently, thus the instance is not global.
4 Complementary and Composite Preference Systems
Complementary preferences appear in systems where peers are equally interested
in the resources they do not have yet. As said in Section 2.1, complementary
preferences can be deduced from marks of the form m(p, q) = v(q) − c(p, q) (in
this case, marks of higher values are preferred).
The expression of a complementary mark matrix m shows that it is a linear
combination of previously discussed global and symmetric mark matrices: m =
v − c, where v deﬁnes a global preference system and c deﬁnes a symmetric
system.
Theorem 2 shows that complementary marks, and more generally any linear
combination of global or symmetric marks, produce acyclic preferences.
Theorem 2. Let m1 and m2 be global or symmetric marks. Any linear combi-
nation λm1 + µm2 is acyclic.
Proof. The proof is practically the same as for Lemma 1. Let us suppose that
the preference system induced by m = λm1 + µm2 contains a preference cycle
p1, p2, . . . , pk, pk+1 = p1, for k ≥ 3. We assume without loss of generality that
m1 is global, m2 symmetric and that marks of higher values are preferred for m.
Then m(pi, pi+1) > m(pi, pi−1) for all i modulo k. Taking a sum over all possible
i, we get
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi+1) >
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi−1) =
k∑
i=1
(λm1(pi, pi−1) + µm2(pi, pi−1)) , but
k∑
i=1
(λm1(pi, pi−1) + µm2(pi, pi−1)) = λ
k∑
i=1
m1(pi−1) + µ
k∑
i=1
m2(pi−1, pi) =
= λ
k∑
i=1
m1(pi+1) + µ
k∑
i=1
m2(pi, pi+1) =
k∑
i=1
m(pi, pi+1).
This contradiction proves the Theorem. uunionsq
Theorem 2 leads to the question whether any linear combination of acyclic
preferences expressed by any kind of marks is also acyclic. The example bellow
illustrates that in general it is not true:
M1 =
 0 3 12 0 1
3 1 0
 , M2 =
 0 1 21 0 3
1 2 0
 , M1 +M2 =
 0 4 33 0 4
4 3 0

The preference instance induced by M1 +M2 has the cycle 1, 2, 3, while both
M1 and M2 are acyclic (both produce global preferences).
Note, that a linear combination of two preference system matrices can give
duplicates in the marks of a single node, which generates ties in preferences. Ties
aﬀect existence and uniqueness of a stable conﬁguration, depending on how they
are handled. If a peer prefers a new node to a current collaborator that has the
same mark, existence is not guaranteed (but if a stable conﬁguration exists, it
is unique). Otherwise, existence stands, but not uniqueness [3].
Application Theorem 2 provides together with Theorem 1 a way of constructing
a tie-less acyclic instance that can take into account several parameters of the
network, given that they all correspond to acyclic preferences: the parameters
can be ﬁrst converted into integer symmetric marks using Algorithm 1. Then a
linear combination using Q-independent scalars produces distinct acyclic marks.
5 Graph properties of stable conﬁgurations
To illustrate the acyclic preferences, in this section, we study the connectivity
property of stable conﬁgurations corresponding to diﬀerent systems. In particu-
lar, we are using the latency matrix of the Meridian Project [6] as an example of
the symmetric marks. The entries of the matrix correspond to the median of the
round-trip time and they were measured using King technique [6]. We compare
it with random symmetric marks and the global preference system6.
To confront these systems we examine connectivity properties of the corre-
sponding stable conﬁgurations. The connectivity was extensively studied since
6 In absence of ties, all global marks are the same up to permutation
Watts survey [14] on the small world graphs. These graphs are known to have
good routing and robustness properties. They are characterized by a small (i.e.
O(log(n)) mean distances and high (i.e. O(1)) clustering. The clustering coeﬃ-
cient is the probability for two vertices x and y to be linked, given that x and y
have at least one common neighbor.
We consider three networks with diﬀerent marks and n = 2500 peers. Figure 1
shows the properties of the stable conﬁguration for these three marks, as a
function of the quota b on the number of links per peer.
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Fig. 1. Diameter and clustering coeﬃcient of latency, random symmetric and global
marks (2500 nodes) stable conﬁgurations. Global marks use an underlying Erdös-Rényi
G(2500, 0.5) acceptance graph.
Global marks produce conﬁguration with disconnected cliques of size b + 1
(maximal clustering, and inﬁnite diameter). We have previously observed this
clusterization eﬀect in [15]. It can be lessened by using an Erdös-Rényi accep-
tance graph, as it can be seen in Figure 1. Then, the conﬁguration still has a
high clustering coeﬃcient, and a high, but ﬁnite diameter (of same order of mag-
nitude as nb ). This is due to a stratiﬁcation eﬀect: peers only link to peers that
have marks similar to them [15].
Random symmetric matrix produces conﬁgurations with low diameter and
clustering coeﬃcient. There characteristics are similar to those of Erdös-Rényi
graphs.
Real latencies from [6] result in both a low diameter and a high clustering
coeﬃcient. This indicates that the corresponding stable conﬁguration has small-
world structure and, therefore, it enjoys nice routing properties. Nevertheless, it
is not a scale-free network [16], because the degree distribution does not follow
a power law (the degrees are bounded by b).
6 Discussion and future work
Stability Decision, whether a stable conﬁguration is a good thing or not, depends
on the characteristics and needs of practical applications. If continuous link
alteration has a high cost (like in structured P2P networks), or if the stable
conﬁguration has appealing properties (like the small-world properties observed
for the Meridian latency-based stable conﬁguration), then it is interesting to let
the system converge. On the other hand, we have observed that global marks
result in a stable conﬁguration with high diameter, which is an undesired feature
in most cases. Moreover, some systems like gossip protocols [17] take advantage
of constant evolution of the corresponding acceptance graph. In such cases, the
eventual convergence would be harmful.
Convergence speed The convergence speed is an important characteristic, no
matter if the stable solution is desired or not. In the ﬁrst case, the application
is interested in speeding up the process. In the second case, the slower possible
speed is preferred instead. Although this question is out of the scope of the
present work, our current experiments suggest that the convergence depends on
many parameters: the preference system used, the acceptance graph, the activity
of peers (details of peers' interaction protocol), the quotas and others. If we use as
time unit the mean interval between two attempts of a given peer to change one
of its neighbors, then preliminary results show that convergence is logarithmic
at best, and polynomial at worst. We plan to provide a complete study on the
inﬂuence of parameters. This should help understanding existing protocols and
making them more eﬃcient.
Dynamics of preference systems We have considered ﬁxed acceptance graph
and preference lists. In real applications, arrivals and departures modify the
acceptance graph, along with the discovery of new contacts (a toy example is
BitTorrent, where a tracker periodically gives new contacts to the clients). The
preference system itself can evolve in time. For instance, latency can increase
if a corresponding link has a congestion problem. A complementary preference
system is dynamic by itself: as a peer gets resources from a complementary peer,
the complementarity mark decreases.
All these changes impact the stable conﬁguration of the system. The ques-
tion is to know whether the convergence speed can sustain the dynamics of
preferences or not. Fast convergence and slow changes allow the system to con-
tinuously adjust (or stay close) to the current stable conﬁguration. Otherwise,
the conﬁgurations of the system may always be far from a stable conﬁguration
that changes too often. The preferable behavior depends on whether stability is
a good feature. This is an interesting direction for future work.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we gave formal deﬁnitions for a b-matching P2P model and analyze
the existence of a stable conﬁguration with preference systems natural for P2P
environment. The term stability in our case corresponds to Pareto eﬃciency of
the collaboration network, since the participants have no incentives to change
such links. We have also showed that in contrast to systems based on intrinsic
capacities, a latency-based stable conﬁguration has small-world characteristics.
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